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Abstract 
This paper investigates why technology-intensive Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
investing direct in the UK. It also examines how investment strategies are being used to enter 
the UK and gain access to technology. Using an inductive multiple case study approach the 
paper finds that Chinese SOEs are motivated by external (national industrial policy) and 
internal factors (vision, ambition and the need for new and more advanced strategic assets). 
With regard to entry strategies it finds that Chinese strategic asset-seeking SOEs are not 
confined to M&As as a means of accessing technology and knowledge. They are also using 
greenfield projects for this purpose. Both investment strategies appear to follow a two-stage 
process. In the first stage the focus is on existing technology originally developed by the 
newly acquired subsidiary, while in the second, the focus would seem to shift to building 
additional R&D capacity and creating new technologies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China is now a major contributor to global foreign direct investment flows, becoming the 
third largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the second largest source of FDI 
globally (UNCTAD 2017).  The rise of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from China 
began with the initiation of the country’s ‘Open Door’ policy in 1979, which was closely 
controlled by the Chinese government. Its subsequent ‘Going Global’ strategy (introduced in 
1999), has since led to a period of increasing liberalisation and growth in OFDI (Buckley et 
al, 2007 and 2010; Sauvant, 2005; Hanemann and Huotari, 2017), which later industrial and 
infrastructure policy initiatives such as ‘Made in China, 2025’ (Wubbeke et al, 2016) and 
‘Belt and Road’ (Hancock, 2017) have also encouraged. Taken together, these successive 
programmes have sought to promote the upgrading and acceleration of Chinese technological 
development (State Council, 2015), using OFDI to create advanced, competitive enterprises 
capable of competing in international markets.  
China’s government is now investing heavily in high-profile domestic industrial projects at 
home as well as encouraging Chinese companies to invest overseas. This policy has been very 
successful, with the result that Chinese OFDI has been growing rapidly at an annual average 
growth rate of 30% between 2005 and 2015 (Hanemann and Huotari, 2017). SOEs account 
for the majority of Chinese overseas investment and their efforts are supported by a range of 
financial and non-financial incentives provided by the country’s government (Davies 2013). 
In Europe, for example, 70% of Chinese FDI is attributed to SOEs (Hanemann and Huotari 
2016). It may, therefore be concluded that the Chinese government expects SOEs to play a 
key role in realising its OFDI-related ambitions.  
The rise of OFDI from emerging markets such as China points towards the validity of existing 
international business theory. This can be seen in terms of three perspectives. 1) Existing 
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theories based on the OLI paradigm (Dunning, Kim and Park, 2008) and the notion of 
country-specific advantages (Rugman, 2008) offer adequate explanations of 
internationalisation of emerging market firms. 2) Firms from emerging markets are so 
distinctive that their behaviour cannot be explained by existing theory and therefore new 
theory is needed (Mathews, 2002; Luo and Tung, 2007). 3) Existing theory can be used but 
requires modification (Ramamurti, 2012; Buckley et al., 2007; Luo, Xue and Han, 2010; 
Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008, Child and Rodrigues, 2005).  
The study of why and how emerging market firms internationalise is of theoretical 
significance because it tests the validity of existing international business theory which was 
based on the study of firms from developed countries. The first and more traditional argument 
is that internationalisation is typically used to exploit existing competitive advantages 
(Dunning, 1993). However, these are generally considered to be more common and stronger 
on the part of more established, Western and Japanese MNEs (Rugman, 2008). A second, 
more recent view is that companies may instead invest overseas in order to obtain the latest 
technologies and know-how and use them to strengthen their competitive advantage (Luo and 
Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). This would appear to provide a far stronger rationale for 
internationalisation and OFDI on the part of China’s rapidly growing SOEs.  
The literature questions whether emerging market multinationals are theoretically different to 
their developed country counterparts (Hernandez and Guillen, 2018). One argument is that 
emerging market firms possess ownership advantages which are different from those found in 
developed country firms (Ramamurti, 2012). Such advantages include unique capabilities 
(combinative capability, hardship-surviving capability, absorptive capability, intelligence 
capability and network capability) and distinctive competitive advantages (cost, speed and 
channel) (Luo, Sun and Wang, 2011). Another proposed difference is that emerging market 
multinationals lack ownership advantages and invest abroad to acquire them (Child and 
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Rodrigues, 2005). Whilst, from a more strategic perspective, it is argued that emerging market 
multinationals have different internationalisation strategies from developed country firms 
(Bonaglia, Goldstein and Mathews, 2007).  
China’s technology-intensive SOEs are going abroad in ever increasing numbers, using OFDI 
to strengthen their competitiveness (Deng et al, 2017) and to compete more effectively against 
Western and Japanese MNEs (Luo and Tung, 2007; Cui et al, 2014). They are doing so by 
acquiring strategic assets, such as technology, knowhow and brands in advanced economies 
(Deng et al, 2017). Competitiveness can be improved at home to some extent but there are 
limitations. In particular, technology transfer can be difficult to achieve because of 
institutional (European Commission 2017; Kim et al. 2016; Buckley et al. 2007; Biosot and 
Meyer 2008, He, Xie and Zhu 2015) and organisational barriers (Ernst and Kim 2002; Giroud 
2000; Ivarsson and Alvstam 2011, Young and Lan 1997, Zhao, Anand and Mitchell 2005; 
Altenburg 2000). Chinese SOEs also engage in international FDI because of entrepreneurial 
insight, vision and ambitions to expand the presence beyond their home market (Alon et al. 
2014). Despite close links to the state, they are in many ways, relatively autonomous, profit-
driven businesses (Jones and Zou 2017).     
China’s MNEs tend to be attracted to advanced economy countries, because of their need to 
acquire strategic assets (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Rugman, 2007) in order to sharpen their 
competitive edge (Luo and Tung, 2007). They are committing increasing levels of OFDI to 
the European Union (EU) and United States (US) (Hanemann and Huotari, 2017) as a means 
to this end. The industrial distribution of their OFDI is diversifying, although many are still 
targeting technology-intensive industries, such as the industrial machinery, ICT and 
renewable energy industries in the EU (Hanemann and Huotari, 2017), and advanced 
manufacturing and technology in the US (Hanemann et al., 2017). The UK received higher 
amounts of Chinese FDI than any other EU country between 2000 and 2016 (Seaman et al, 
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2017), but the reasons for this have been neglected by researchers. The first objective of this 
paper is therefore to determine why technologically-intensive Chinese SOEs are investing 
direct in the UK.  
Whilst scholars have made some effort to understand how Chinese SOEs are accessing 
strategic assets in advanced economy countries, this is still an under researched area. There is 
now some understanding of how this is occurring, based on findings drawn from Chinese 
SOEs’ investments in several European countries (Zheng et al, 2016), but this provides only a 
limited insight into the mechanisms through which these companies are gaining access to 
strategic assets in advanced economy countries by M&As and greenfield projects. Therefore, 
the second objective of this paper is to examine how Chinese SOEs are using investment 
strategies to enter the UK and gain access to technology. 
In general terms, this paper seeks to enlarge the international business literature on emerging 
market multinationals and their cross-border investment activities.  More specifically, it adds 
to the relatively new but growing body of research which examines the investment activities 
of emerging market multinationals in developed countries. The contribution of this paper is 
twofold. First, it contributes to the empirical literature on Chinese investment in Europe. By 
investigating the investment behaviour of Chinese SOEs in the UK, it adds to our 
understanding of their investment motivations and strategies. Second, it contributes to the 
existing theoretical debate on emerging market multinationals. In doing so it challenges the 
mainstream view that these multinationals must have certain competitive advantages in order 
to internationalise. Rather, it finds support for the view that some emerging market 
multinationals engage in OFDI to acquire such advantages.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1.Background 
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have taken the lead in driving China’s OFDI 
upwards, supported by a range of government-led incentives (Zhou, Gao and Zhao, 2017; 
Amighini, Rabellotti and Sanfilippo, 2013).  Their international investment efforts receive 
financial and commercial support from a range of institutions including policy-making bodies 
such as MOFCOM, National Development and Reform Commission, banks and insurance 
companies (Davies, 2013). Large SOEs operating in priority sectors also have access to state-
backed financial support for their domestic and international operations, in the form of below-
market rate loans, direct capital contributions and subsidies linked to official aid programmes. 
The China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export and Import Bank are key providers of 
financial support. The state also provides Chinese outward investors with non-financial 
incentives such as corporation tax exemptions and value added tax refunds (OECD, 2008).   
The existence of this extensive package of support points to the key role that the Chinese 
government expects SOEs to play in supporting their domestic and international expansion 
and development, linked to the country’s national strategic and industrial policy priorities for 
technology and innovation (Zhou et al, 2017; Amighini et al, 2013). The Chinese government 
is clearly hoping that SOEs will be able to acquire the latest technologies and know-how from 
advanced economy countries, and to use them to strengthen their global competitive edge 
(Zhou, Gao and Zhao, 2017; Luo et al, 2010; Zhou et al., 2017). Many Chinese SOEs are 
now, indeed seeking to turn these hopes into reality, by becoming major investors in advanced 
economies (OECD, 2008), where they are using OFDI to transform their core competencies 
and improve their competitive position by acquiring scale, new markets and strategic assets 
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(including intellectual property, technology, brands and talent) (Cui, Meyer and Hu, 2014; 
Deng et al., 2017).  
 
Few Chinese companies, including SOEs have the option of achieving these advances at 
home, since technological upgrading is difficult to achieve in the domestic context. 
Institutional barriers such as joint venture requirements, market entry restrictions, technology 
transfer obligations and unjustifiable technical regulations (European Commission, 2017) 
deter foreign investors from coming to China, which in turn limits opportunities for 
technology transfer to domestically owned-enterprises. A further institutional deterrent is the 
weak enforcement of IPR laws which falls below international standards (Kim et al., 2016). 
This problem is especially relevant in knowledge-intensive industries, where companies are 
more sensitive to the quality of IPR protection regimes (Markusen, 2001; Javorcik, 2004).  
 
Inefficiencies in domestic institutions also incentivise Chinese companies to invest overseas. 
They are frequently faced with burdensome administrative procedures at home, owing to 
persistent and significant interference by local and central government (Buckley et al., 2007; 
He, Xie and Zhu, 2015). The costs of doing business in China are also increased by local 
protectionism at provincial or municipal level, inefficient logistics networks (Biosot and 
Meyer, 2008) and corruption (He, Xie and Zhu, 2015). These weaknesses encourage domestic 
firms to seek out more efficient institutional environments overseas, especially in advanced 
economies, where they can enjoy the same levels of economic and legal protection, including 
property rights as their leading international competitors. A recent longitudinal study (Shi et 
al., 2017) supports this view, finding that domestic institutional hindrances (such as 
institutional fragility at the Chinese provincial level) increase the likelihood of OFDI from 
China. 
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Further obstacles to the technological upgrading of Chinese companies at home can be found 
at firm level. Inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) could, potentially open up opportunities 
for technology transfer to Chinese firms that form supplier relationships with foreign MNEs 
(Ernst and Kim, 2002; Kim and Nelson, 2000; Giroud, 2000; Ivarsson and Alvstam, 2011). 
However, empirical evidence shows that the extent of this technology transfer often falls short 
of expectations (Young and Lan, 1997), for two main reasons. Firstly, foreign-owned MNEs 
tend to confine their core innovation to advanced countries, while secondly, technology 
transfer can make Chinese firms over-dependent on foreign customers, creating an unequal 
balance of power (Sun and Du, 2011) which can limit future technology transfer 
opportunities.  
International joint venture arrangements can also be a potential basis for technology transfer 
from foreign-owned MNEs to Chinese companies (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Park, Giroud and 
Glaister, 2009; Tsang, 2002). However, technological upgrading by this route may be 
hindered by a fundamental divergence of strategic interests (Zhao, Anand and Mitchell, 
2005). Foreign-owned MNEs are often unwilling to share core technologies with Chinese 
joint venture partners, since this could lead to an erosion of competitive advantage (Wong et 
al., 2003; Altenburg, 2000). Chinese partners are also more likely to engage in the simpler, 
end stages of the R&D process (such as localising or adapting existing designs), whilst 
foreign-owned MNEs more typically undertake the more important early and middle stages of 
the process (such as design and engineering). Consequently, Chinese partners are granted only 
limited exposure to core R&D processes, imposing limits on the level of technology transfer. 
Technology sharing can also be restricted through selective disclosure and the blocking of 
certain transfer mechanisms by foreign-owned MNEs (Young and Lan, 1997; Wong et al., 
2003), limiting opportunities for Chinese partner upgrading.  
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Technology transfer in China can also be restricted by the ability of Chinese companies to 
recognise, assimilate and apply new outside knowledge (Chen, 2004; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998; Lichtenthaler and Eckhard, 2010). Their ability to do so successfully is governed by 
their existing internal knowledge base and absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Chinese companies with strong absorptive capacity (Fu, 2008) and existing R&D capability 
are more likely to capture new knowledge benefits than those which lack these advantages 
(Li, Chen and Shapiro, 2010; Sun, 2002). The extent of local knowledge transfer from 
foreign-owned enterprises may, therefore be limited if the knowledge gap between Chinese 
and foreign companies is too large.  
It would, however be too simplistic to assume that Chinese SOEs only internationalise 
because of the institutional and organisational barriers that they face at home. Although 
heavily influenced by home institutions, they are, at the same time, relatively autonomous, 
profit-driven businesses (Jones and Zou, 2017) that display corporate features (Zhang, 2010). 
Their overseas investments can, therefore be motivated by a range of other factors such as 
their entrepreneurial insight, business leaders’ vision, business expansion opportunities, 
access to natural resources and the perceived importance of host country markets (Alon et al., 
2014).  
 
2.2. Internationalisation and the search for competitive advantage  
The theoretical literature offers two competing views as to the advantages that companies 
such as China’s SOEs can gain by internationalising and developing into multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). The first and more traditional position is that internationalisation can be 
used in order to exploit existing competitive advantages, based on an underlying idea that 
MNEs typically possess unique and inimitable advantages over their host country 
competitors. Dunning referred to these as ‘ownership advantages’ while Rugman identified 
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them as ‘firm-specific advantages’ (Dunning, 1993; Rugman, 2008). Their argument is that 
MNEs would not be able to internationalise successfully without possessing such advantages, 
which are however generally considered to be far more common and stronger in the case of 
established Western and Japanese MNEs.   
 
The second, more recent approach has been developed in response to the rise to international 
prominence of MNEs from emerging economy countries, challenging the idea that MNEs 
must have an established  competitive advantage (Cui et al, 2014; Luo and Tung, 2007; Deng, 
2007 and 2009; Mathews, 2006; Wang et al, 2012). The main idea here is that MNEs from 
emerging economies, such as China, internationalise not to exploit an existing competitive 
advantage but to gain one. This view is, therefore based on the use that is, arguably being 
made of internationalisation to explore new, rather than exploit existing sources of 
competitive advantage by an increasing number of emerging economy (including Chinese) 
MNEs. 
Chinese MNEs often invest in advanced economy countries in order to access strategic assets 
such as advanced technology, brands (Child and Rodrigues, 2005) and knowledge (Rugman, 
2007) which can be used to create new competitive edge. There appears to be a need for 
strategic assets that are not readily available in China, but could help its MNEs to compete 
more effectively with their established Western and Japanese MNEs (Deng, 2007). Chinese 
MNEs need to develop new resources and capabilities (Wright et al., 2005) in order to 
counteract their competitive weaknesses (Luo and Tung, 2007), as illustrated by case studies 
of Zhejiang and Geely (Fetscherin, Beuttenmuller, 2012) and  Lenovo, Nanjing Automobile 
and Huawei (Huaichuan and Yip, 2008).  
The overseas investment activities of Chinese SOEs are also driven by other factors such as 
entrepreneurial insight and vision of business leaders, importance of host country market and 
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the need for expansion amongst others (Alon et al., 2014). Although these organisations are 
influenced by the state and home institutions, their behaviour is largely market-driven and 
autonomous (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2012). They are profit-seeking entities that display corporate 
behaviour (Zhang, 2010) comparable to those of countries where the role of the state is less 
prominent.  
During the decade since 2008, Chinese OFDI has gained momentum in the US and EU, 
enabling a growing number of its MNEs to upgrade their technological assets and know-how, 
helping them  to compete more effectively at home and in international markets (Rosen and 
Hanemann, 2013). The EU, for example received EUR 20 billion of investment from China in 
2015, increasing by 77% to EUR 35 billion by the following year (Hanemann and Huatari, 
2017). Chinese investors are showing a particularly strong interest in investing in high 
technology sectors such as industrial machinery and equipment, ICT, utilities, transport and 
infrastructure and renewable energy (Hanemann and Huotari, 2017). They are using this 
investment as a means of accessing supply chains, quality brand names and advanced 
technology in Europe, reflecting China’s government-promoted economic shift towards 
higher value added industries including technology and services (Seaman, Huotari and Otero-
Iglesias, 2017). The leading destination countries chosen for Chinese OFDI in Europe – UK 
23%; Germany 19%; Italy 13% and France 11% cumulative from 2000-2016- also indicated a 
clear preference on its corporate investors’ part for investments in technology, know-how, 
brands and R&D (Seaman, Huotari and Otero-Iglesias, 2017).  
Chinese OFDI flows into the US have also increased rapidly in recent years, reaching a value 
of more than USD 15 billion in 2015 (Hanemann, Rosen and Gao, 2016), tripling to USD 46 
billion by the following year (Hanemann, Rosen and Gao, 2017). Chinese MNEs are investing 
direct in a broad range of US industries, focusing particularly on technology, modern services 
and safe haven assets. There has been a rapid growth of Chinese investment in technology and 
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innovation-related activities, helping its MNEs to move further up their value chains, while an 
expansion in the numbers of Chinese-owned US-based subsidiaries engaged in manufacturing 
and R&D has also been recorded (United States-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 2017). The range of US industries that attract Chinese investor interests is also 
increasing,  although services and advanced manufacturing (including ICT, entertainment, 
transport and infrastructure and consumer products) accounted  for more than 90% of Chinese 
OFDI to the US (Hanemann, Rosen and Gao, 2017).  
Although the ownership structure of China’s overseas investors is by no means uniform, it is 
clear that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are playing a significant part in the country’s OFDI. 
Although private investors are becoming increasingly important, SOEs continue to account 
for the majority of Chinese FDI flows to the EU. Interestingly, SOEs’ share of total Chinese 
investment value into the EU appears to have increased from 62% in 2014 to 70% in 2015 
(Hanemann and Huotari, 2016).  Meanwhile, in the US, the situation is somewhat different. 
From 2009 to 2013 Chinese OFDI was driven largely by SOEs, accounting for more than 
65% of cumulative Chinese OFDI value in the US.  More recently, however, privately owned 
investors have taken the lead, resulting in a decline in Chinese SOE investment.  By the end 
of 2015, the share of SOEs in cumulative investment had reduced to 35% (Hanemann, Rosen 
and Gao, 2017).  
 
2.3. Strategies for host country entry and technology transfer 
The cross-border literature offers some insight into how emerging economy (including 
Chinese) MNEs make use of overseas expansion to gain access to new strategic assets and 
competitive advantage.  When investing in advanced economy countries, Chinese MNEs tend 
to create wholly owned subsidiaries by means of M&As, and ‘greenfield’ projects (Hanemann 
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et al., 2017; Hanemann and Rosen, 2012; Clegg and Voss, 2012; Rhodium Group, 2017; 
Klossek et al., 2012; Liu and Zou, 2008). Country-level research from Germany and the UK 
suggests that Chinese investors often preferred greenfield investment in the past (Klossek, 
Linke and Nippa, 2012; Burghart, Rossi, 2009). But, more recent findings using aggregate 
data show that M&As are now the dominant entry mode for Chinese direct investors in both 
the EU (Hanemann and Rosen, 2012; Clegg and Voss, 2012; Rhodium Group, 2017) and in 
the US (Hanemann, Rosen and Gao, 2017). Data from the EU-28 countries shows that 
Chinese-led M&As outstripped greenfield projects (based on the value and the number of 
projects undertaken in the EU) between 2015 and 2016 (Rhodium Group, 2017). Recent high 
profile acquisitions on both sides of the Atlantic have drawn attention to Chinese OFDI by the 
M&A route. For example in the EU, a Tencent-led consortium purchased Finnish gaming 
company Supercell, Midea acquired German robotics company KUKA, and Ctrip took over 
UK travel platform Skyscanner  during this period (Hanemann, Huotari, 2017). Meanwhile in 
the US, Haier acquired GE’s home appliances unit, while Wanda took over Legendary 
Pictures (Deng et al., 2017). Despite this flurry of acquisitions, however it is worth pointing 
out that greenfield projects still remain an important part of Chinese OFDI in advanced 
economy countries.  Although we have some understanding of the entry modes used by 
Chinese MNEs with OFDI in the EU, there is a lack of evidence relating specifically to the 
particular entry modes used by SOEs.  
 
The main factors that influence Chinese MNEs’ entry mode decisions have been studied in 
the internationalisation literature. It has been found that a range of factors, including strategic 
intent, in-house resources, industry conditions, institutional forces, transactional and firm-
specific factors (Cui, Jiang and Stening, 2011; Wu, Liu and Huang, 2012) all impact on entry 
mode decisions. Despite the range of internal and external determinants identified by existing 
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studies, there appears to be an emphasis on strategic intent, suggesting a link between Chinese 
MNEs’ strategies and their entry mode choices. 
One early study makes this point by arguing that Chinese MNEs looking for strategic assets 
such as foreign technology, R&D skills and reputable brands tend to opt for acquisitions, 
while those looking to localise products and raise brand awareness tend to establish 
subsidiaries by greenfield investments in foreign host countries (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
More recent studies have gone on to show that Chinese MNEs often engage in M&A as a 
means of acquiring strategic assets (Deng et al., 2017; Deng, 2009) such as technology, R&D, 
human capital, brands, buyer-supplier networks and management expertise  (Luo and Tung, 
2007; Wu, Liu and Huang, 2012; Stucchi, 2012). However, it may be possible that Chinese 
MNEs are using other entry modes such as greenfield projects to access strategic assets in 
advanced economy countries.  
Although we know that Chinese investors are creating wholly owned subsidiaries via M&As 
in order to acquire strategic assets in Europe and the US, it is not clear how this is occurring. 
Zheng et al (2016) have sought to study the mechanisms underlying this type of investment, 
but their research has two methodological limitations. Firstly, it focuses on Chinese M&As 
alone without taking greenfield OFDI into account. Secondly, its conclusions are based on 
several EU countries including the UK, but it does not offer comprehensive insight into the 
ways in which Chinese investors are, in fact making use of their UK subsidiaries to gain 
access to technology as a key strategic asset.   
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The overall aim of this paper is to contribute to academic knowledge and understanding by 
exploring the investment activities of technologically-intensive Chinese SOEs in the UK, with 
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particular reference to their motivations for UK location, entry and technology-access 
strategies. This paper seeks to answer two main research questions:  
i) Why are technologically-intensive Chinese SOEs investing direct in the UK?  
ii) How are they using investment strategies to enter the UK and gain access to 
technology? 
In order to answer these research questions, an exploratory methodology was used, reflecting 
the relative lack of existing research (Silverman, 2013) into these topics. OFDI from China is 
still a relatively new phenomenon (Peng, 2012). Although Chinese direct investment into 
Europe has been increasing rapidly, the numbers are still low; in 2011, for example Chinese 
MNEs only contributed 0.03% of total inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) value into 
Europe (Clegg and Voss, 2012). Although SOEs account for 70% of this total (Hanemann and 
Huotari, 2016), the population in question was still relatively small, making it impossible to 
conduct a large scale survey, owing to severe limitations on feasible sample size.  
An interpretive, inductive methodology was therefore selected for our research, enabling us to 
carry out an in-depth study (Yin, 2014; Robson, 2002) of Chinese SOEs that were investing 
direct in the UK. This allowed us to provide a richer understanding (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007) of the reasons for their UK investment and related investment strategies, than could 
have been achieved by using a positivist, deductive methodology. A multiple case study 
strategy was chosen, because it provided a particularly useful way of examining the emergent 
phenomena in question (Birkinshaw, Brannen and Tung, 2011), characterised by limited 
existing knowledge (Collis and Hussey, 2003). This strategy made us more able to capture the 
complexity (Stake, 1995) of respondents’ thinking and strategic decision taking. 
Non-probability sampling methods were used to identify potential respondents, resulting in 
methodological limitations which we believe were countered by the richness of the data 
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gathered (Silverman, 2013). Our selection of sample cases was based on several criteria. It 
was, firstly important that the companies were all state-owned, reflecting the parameters of 
our research. They had, secondly to be technology- intensive making them more likely to 
engage in technology transfer than others. They must, thirdly have undertaken FDI in the UK 
relatively recently (from 2008 onwards), while they had also to be drawn from the widest 
possible range of industries, for bias avoidance reasons.  
3.1 Data Collection 
In the absence of a database of Chinese investors in the UK, a list of eligible companies was 
compiled from a special publication on Chinese investment in the UK (China-Britain 
Business Council, 2010) . Each was then contacted by telephone and email, following which 
four were selected for interview from the automotive, manufacturing and semiconductor 
industries:  
Table 1. Case study profiles 
Respondents in each company were chosen (by agreement with senior management) on the 
basis of their knowledge, understanding and experience (Mason, 2002) of the UK investment 
process. They consisted mainly of senior managers (including general managers and 
specialists in areas such as R&D, Engineering and Finance) and some senior employees (such 
as engineers and R&D coordinator). It was possible, in the three M&A cases to interview 
respondents from both the acquiring and acquired companies, ensuring that views from both 
sides of the investment story were considered. In the greenfield project case, data was 
gathered only from a senior executive from the investing company. Responses were also 
received from external organisations such as UK Trade and Investment and specialised 
engineering consultancies that had experience of working with Chinese SOEs and were 
therefore well-positioned to provide impartial views.  
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3.2. Interviews 
Once first contacts with companies were established and the aims of the study had been 
explained and agreed, fifteen face-to-face interviews were arranged. The interviews were 
semi-structured to facilitate a structured discussion which also provided room for follow-up 
questions (Rubin and Rubin, 2012), where respondents could express their understanding and 
opinions (Gao and Liu, 2012). Each interview lasted approximately one hour and took place 
at the company’s UK premises. All respondents were proficient English speakers so all of the 
interviews were conducted in English. Most were recorded, while notes were taken by 
agreement during interviews where recording was not allowed. Once the interviews had been 
transcribed and the notes edited, they were sent back to the relevant company for verification 
and comment. Interview data was supplemented by secondary data gathered from company 
websites, annual reports, internal communication and media reports (Yin, 2014). 
Using an inductive approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) the verified interview and secondary data 
were synthesised (Yin, 2009). The combined data were then coded and grouped into the 
following themes:  
Motivations: Ambition and vision; technology gap; technology acquisition 
Entry Strategies: Access to existing technology; application of existing technology; access to 
new technology; development of new technology 
Once a detailed understanding of each case had been built up, cross-case analysis was 
conducted. Themes found within each case were then examined across all cases and in 
relation to the existing literature. The multiple case study strategy enabled us to make use of 
replication logic, whereby each case was observed as a different experiment that might or 
might not confirm our findings (Yin, 2014; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This analytical 
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technique increased the likelihood that our findings were more robust, compared to those 
which could be derived from a single case study.  
The difficulty in generalising findings has been the most widely criticised aspect of case study 
research (Silverman, 2013). However case studies were not designed with this purpose in 
mind, having instead an exemplary function (Thomas, 2011), with their purpose being one of 
particularisation rather than generalisation (Stake, 1995). With regards to our study, the aim 
was to gain insight into the thinking of managers drawn from a specific, small group of 
companies, in a particular context. It was not to draw conclusions which could then be 
generalised to the entire population of Chinese MNEs with FDI in the UK.  
Potential problems relating to interviewee subjectivity (Gillham, 2000; Roulston, deMarrais 
and Lewis, 2003) were minimised by including respondents from Chinese MNEs and the UK 
companies that they owned, as well as representatives of independent organisations with 
experience of working with the former companies. Interviewee subjectivity was also 
mitigated by the inclusion of respondents from a range of roles across our case study 
companies. Findings from each case were, moreover triangulated with those from other cases 
as part of the cross-cross analysis stage of our research. 
To ensure verifiability and reliability, interviews with case study companies C1, C2, C3 and 
C4 were triangulated with interviews from external organisations C5, C6, C7 and C8. This 
consisted of six respondents across four independent organisations as illustrated in Table 3. 
Two of the organisations are engineering consultancies, one is a government agency and one 
is communications organisation specialised in engineering. The responses from these 
organisations were triangulated according to themes that emerged from case study interviews.  
Table 2: Case study respondents  
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Table 3: External respondents 
 
4. Findings 
 
4.1. Why are technology-intensive Chinese SOEs investing direct in the UK? 
Our findings suggest that the main driving force behind our sample companies’ investment 
decisions is their inherent ambition and vision, as evidenced by the following quotations: 
We plan to become a world leading automotive company (SM11). We would be able 
to become a leader in technology (SM21). The management has a long-term vision 
(SM31). Become one of the biggest automotive players in the world (SM41).  
The companies that took part in our research have ambitious long-term goals of becoming 
global leaders in their respective sectors. But in order to challenge global rivals, they will first 
need to overcome the technological gap that exists between them. Their understanding of the 
resultant strategic challenges that they face are illustrated in Table 4. Based on the quotations 
it is clear that the technology possessed by our case study companies lags behind international 
standards. The main reason for this technology gap is the lack of experience and know-how 
which prevents development of new technology and innovative activity. The problem is not 
lack of potential or technical ability but lack of practical experience needed for technological 
development.  
The findings show that one of the ways in which our companies are attempting to reduce this 
gap is by investing in the UK. The main aim is to access and develop technology, know-how, 
skills and experience so that they can then generate their own intellectual property. An 
additional aim is to increase their R&D capability, which can lead to new product 
development in conjunction with their new UK subsidiaries. Evidence of these aims can be 
seen in the following quotations: 
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Table 4: Technological gap and technology acquisition 
 
4.2. How are they using investment strategies to enter the UK and gain access to technology? 
 4.2.1. M&A investment projects 
Our findings suggest that Chinese SOEs that enter the UK by M&As appear to be making use 
of two-stage post- investment strategies to gain access to technology and increase their R&D 
capability: 
Figure 1: M&A-related technology access strategies 
Stage 1: Accessing existing technology 
 
Stag 
  
Target 
company 
Existing 
technology 
Acquiring 
company 
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Stage 2: Developing new technology 
 
 
            
     
  
In the first stage, they appear to be using their investments to acquire existing technology 
found in acquired companies. This enables them to launch new products rapidly, without 
investing in R&D resources, and to achieve technological catch up over a short period of 
time.  For example, companies C2 and C3 started to sell products originally developed by the 
acquired company in China soon after the takeover without making adjustments. They did not 
have to develop any new technology to launch products new to the Chinese market. 
Meanwhile company C4 made small adjustments to existing products before launching them 
in China, they too used technology developed by the acquired company as evidenced by the 
following quotations:  
Table 5: The use of acquired firm’s existing technology 
 
In the second stage, the SOEs would seem to be going on to build on their new subsidiaries’ 
existing technology by using their R&D capabilities to deliver further technological advances. 
Use is made of their target companies’ (as well as their own) technological knowledge, skills 
and employee experience as a means to this end. The SOEs also use their UK subsidiaries as a 
platform for external collaboration with local universities and specialised consultancies, 
helping them to generate leading edge technologies by accessing a wider pool of expertise 
outside their organisational boundaries, as the figure below indicates. Taken together, these 
Target 
company 
External 
collaborators 
New 
technology 
Acquiring 
company 
Local 
workforce 
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strategies can help them to achieve their technological ambitions and to develop their long-
term competitiveness in international markets. 
Table 6: New technology development in the UK 
 
4.2.2. Greenfield investment projects: 
Our findings indicate, interestingly that company C1 (which carried out a greenfield 
investment project in the UK), had a similar approach to technology transfer to companies C2, 
C3 and C4 (all of which used M&As for this purpose). Unlike the M&A cases, however, its 
technology access strategy consists of only one stage, which is very similar to Stage 2 of the 
M&A model: 
Figure 2: Greenfield project technology access and creation 
 
 
 
 
 
It would seem that the aim of this investing company is to create new technology in the UK 
by drawing on the knowledge, skills and experience of the local labour force. Its new, 
greenfield UK subsidiary is staffed mainly by local employees, owing to their superior R&D 
capabilities. This subsidiary also serves as a platform for forming external partnerships with 
local organisations including privately-owned companies, research organisations and 
universities all of which have their own, distinctive areas of expertise. Thus, despite 
operational differences between M&A- and greenfield projects, the strategies for accessing 
technology appear to be remarkably similar in both of these cases.  
UK 
subsidiary 
New 
technology 
Investing 
company 
External 
collaborators 
Local 
workforce 
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We recognise the skills are there; we are aware of the legacy of the automotive industry 
and are particularly interested in powertrain expertise; most of the staff are locally 
recruited and are involved directly in R&D; we work with private companies such as 
Ricardo, Mahle, Mira and universities such as Birmingham, Nottingham and 
Loughborough. (SM11) 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
5.1. Why are Chinese SOEs investing direct in the UK? 
Our findings indicate that all of the sample of Chinese SOEs that took part in this study aspire 
to become global leaders in their respective sectors, and they see investing in the UK as part 
of the actions needed to fulfil this aim. Their ambitions are partly innate, resulting from 
entrepreneurial insight and business vision (Alon et al., 2014), and profit-seeking behaviour 
(Jones and Zou, 2017). Their investments are, in this sense driven by the same motivations as 
any other organisation, regardless of ownership or country of origin. On the other hand, one 
thing that makes Chinese SOEs unique is that their strategic aims are shaped by national 
policy. China’s latest Five-Year Plan, along with its “Made in China 2025” and “Belt and 
Road” policies express the need for continued economic development based on innovation 
and overseas investment. Therefore the investment activities conducted by Chinese SOEs in 
the UK can be seen in part as a manifestation of these state policies.  
Based on these findings it is evident that Chinese SOEs wish to close the technology gap 
between themselves and their leading international competitors. To address this, they have all 
invested in the UK in order to acquire technology, know-how, skills and experience. From a 
theoretical point of view, this finding is in line with the exploration argument which states 
that firms from emerging markets invest abroad in order to acquire competitive advantage 
(Luo and Tung, 2007; Deng, 2007; Mathews, 2006). The results counter the traditional view 
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that internationalising companies must already have a firm-specific or ownership specific 
advantage before they can develop into fully fledged MNEs (Rugman, 2008; Dunning, 1993).   
From an empirical point of view the results of this study contribute towards our understanding 
of Chinese investment in advanced economies, especially the EU. The prevailing view is that 
Chinese MNEs invest in these economies in order to access strategic assets that enhance their 
competitive edge (Deng, 2007), including advanced knowledge, technology and brands (Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005; Rugman, 2007). Recent evidence from the EU-28 countries suggests 
that there is now a particularly strong Chinese interest in investing in their high technology 
sectors (Hanemann and Huotari, 2017) but there has been no evidence relating specifically to 
Chinese investment in the UK’s high-technology firms until now.   
Our findings therefore add to our understanding of Chinese investment behaviour in Europe 
by providing a new empirical insight into the UK context. They suggest that Chinese SOEs 
seek to leverage their UK investments in order to acquire local technology, know-how, skills 
and the experience embedded in local organisations, with a view to reducing their technology 
gaps. Their reasons for investing in the UK would therefore appear to be no different from 
those of Chinese firms that investing in other EU-28 countries.   
5.2. Which investment strategies are they using to enter and access technology in the UK? 
Existing studies (Klossek, Linke and Nippa, 2012; Clegg and Voss, 2012; Rhodium Group, 
2017) show that Chinese MNEs are likely to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries via the 
M&A or greenfield project routes, when investing in advanced economies such as the EU. 
However, there has until now been a lack of empirical evidence relating to the investment 
strategies followed by Chinese SOEs in the UK context. The findings of this study show that 
Chinese SOEs appear to prefer M&A and greenfield strategies for their UK investments, 
reflecting the strategies followed by other such MNEs that invest in different parts of the EU.  
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The extant literature makes a link between the motives underlying MNEs’ overseas 
investments and the types of entry mode that they choose. Empirical evidence from Chinese 
MNEs in particular (Deng et al., 2017; Wu, Liu and Huang, 2012; Deng, 2009), shows that 
they are likely to use M&As than greenfield investments as a means of accessing foreign 
strategic assets. But our research findings suggest that Chinese SOEs in the UK (at least) may 
be more open-minded in this regard, being willing to use not only M&As (as existing research 
suggests), but also greenfield investment as a means of accessing strategic assets.  
Past researchers have shed some light on the ways in which Chinese MNEs are accessing 
strategic assets overseas (Kale, Singh and Raman, 2009; Kumar, 2009; Zheng et al., 2016) but 
our current understanding is still limited. The findings of this study contribute to the 
development of this understanding with specific reference to Chinese SOEs in the UK 
context. Looking firstly at M&As, our findings suggest that they appear to be gaining access 
to strategic assets using a two stage process. In the first stage, they are accessing their new 
subsidiaries’ existing technology, while, in the second, they are engaging directly in 
technology creation. Secondly, in the case of greenfield projects, they may go directly to the 
knowledge creation stage. These finding highlight that access strategies are being based not 
only on gaining existing assets but also in creating new ones.  
This finding is also interesting from the theoretical point of view. Adopting the exploration 
perspective, it is clear that our sample companies entered the UK in order to access certain 
strategic assets, as the existing literature (Luo and Tung, 2007; Deng, 2009; Mathews, 2006) 
suggests. It may, therefore be necessary for future researchers to extend direct investment 
theory, so that it makes reference not only to asset exploration and the transfer of existing 
assets, but also to asset creation by overseas subsidiaries.  From the evidence provided it is 
notable that companies engaged in acquisitions were initially interested in assimilating 
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existing technology, but their interest soon shifted to knowledge creation where it 
subsequently remained. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using a multiple case study approach to gather interpretive data from four technology-
intensive Chinese SOEs, this study has found that they can be motivated to invest direct in the 
UK by both external and internal factors. National industrial policy can play a key role in 
encouraging SOEs to venture abroad, while vision and ambition to become global leaders 
may represent strong internal drivers. The SOEs appear also to be motivated to enter the UK 
by a need for new and more advanced strategic assets, technology and know-how. Their 
intention then appears to be to use these strategic assets to build up their international 
competitiveness, helping them to fulfil their global competitive ambitions.  
 
Empirical Implications 
In the first place, our findings contribute empirically towards the development of scholarly 
knowledge and understanding regarding the reasons for Chinese technology-intensive SOEs’ 
decisions to invest in the UK, and the investment drivers and strategies that underpin these 
decisions. With regard to entry strategies, the findings indicate that investments by Chinese 
strategic asset-seeking SOEs are not confined to M&As, since they may also establish 
greenfield projects as a means of accessing technology and knowledge. Moreover, they show 
that both M&As and greenfield projects are being used to access the advanced technology 
owned by UK companies. Acquisitions appear to follow a two-stage process, comprising an 
initial focus on existing technologies owned by their new subsidiaries that could be used to 
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launch new products soon after takeover. In the second stage, the focus would seem to shift to 
building additional R&D capacity and creating new technologies by using advanced, 
subsidiary-based knowledge in conjunction with outside organisations’ expertise. SOEs that 
enter the UK by the greenfield project route also appear to be following a similar approach 
towards accessing UK companies’ technology.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
In the second place, the findings that we have drawn from this study have theoretical 
implications. They question the view that emerging market multinationals need to have 
conventional firm-specific advantages to internationalise. The findings provide support for the 
argument that technology-intensive companies may engage in OFDI in order to acquire 
strategic assets that are scarce at home. On this basis, it may therefore be argued that our 
Chinese SOEs are displaying overseas investment behaviours typical of emerging economy 
MNEs. Their apparent interest in technology creation suggests, however that they are going 
beyond accessing existing technologies in the UK, to creating new ones. Existing theories 
focus on emerging economy MNEs’ access to overseas strategic assets, but do not take this 
second possibility into account. We would, therefore argue (following Child and Rodriguez, 
2005) that there is now a need for these theories to be extended, to take this new post-
investment behaviour into account.  
Policy implications 
China’s interest in technology has been noted by policy-makers in the EU and US alike. They 
share growing concerns that Chinese SOEs are increasingly gaining access to advanced 
technologies which may pose a threat to the competitiveness of Western and Japanese MNEs, 
and ultimately the leading role that the EU and US occupy in the global economy. Following 
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a recent spate of high technology acquisitions in Germany, there is now growing concern 
about these SOEs’ investment and technology access strategies on the part of EU member 
states (Hanemann and Huatari, 2017). The US, in turn has become particularly uneasy about 
these activities from a national security point of view, and is generally considered to be more 
cautious and reserved towards Chinese OFDI than the EU (United States-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, 2017).  The Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States therefore now actively monitors investment from China (Hanemann, Rosen and 
Gao, 2017) while the EU is considering taking similar action in future. 
Looking ahead, policy-makers in all advanced economies will have the difficult task of 
balancing the benefits of Chinese OFDI with the potential loss of control that this may bring 
over advanced technology. The challenge will be keeping the door open to Chinese 
investment, in the spirit of economic liberalism, whilst managing the concomitant loss of 
control over leading technologies and know-how.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Table 1. Case study profiles 
Company C1 C2 C3 C4 
Industry Automotive Semiconductors Manufacturing Automotive 
Ownership State State State State 
Investment year UK 2010 2008 2010 2008 
Entry mode UK Greenfield Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition 
No. of employees 
(2016) 
50,000 7,569 11,217 171,395 
Profit RMB ‘000 
(2016) 
139,637 1,225,189 506,199 29,793,790 
Respondents: 1 5 3 7 
Senior Managers SM 
Code 
1 
SM11 
2 
SM21; SM22 
3 
SM31; SM32; 
SM33 
7 
SM41; SM42; 
SM43; SM44; 
SM45 
SM46; SM47 
Senior Employees SE 
Code 
0 
 
3 
SE21; SE22; 
SE23 
0 0 
Source: Author’s database and company websites 
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Table 2: Case study respondents 
C1 Vice 
General 
Manager 
(SM11) 
     
C2 Director of 
R&D 
(SM21) 
Assistant 
Director of 
Assembly 
Workshop 
(SM22) 
Chief 
Engineer 
(SE21) 
Design 
Engineer 
(SE22) 
R&D 
Coordinator 
(SE23) 
 
C3 General 
Manager 
(SM31) 
Engineering 
Manager 
(SM32) 
Head of 
import/export 
(SM33) 
   
C4 Head of 
Vehicle 
Programmes 
(SM41) 
Director of 
Business 
Development 
(SM42) 
Head of 
Powertrain 
Integration 
(SM43) 
Head of 
Chassis 
Engineering 
(SM44) 
Head of IT 
and Quality 
(SM45) 
Head of 
Vehicle 
Trim 
Engineering 
(SM46) 
 Head of 
Finance 
(SM47) 
     
Source: Author’s database 
 
Table 3: External respondents 
C5 Group 
Sales 
Director 
(SM51) 
      
C6 Engineering 
Director 
(SM61) 
Sales and 
Marketing 
Manager 
(SM62) 
Principal 
Project 
Manager 
(SM63) 
    
C7 Automotive 
industry 
expert 
(SE71) 
      
C8 Technology 
specialist 
(SE81) 
      
Source: Author’s database 
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Table 4: Technological gap and technology acquisition 
Company Technological gap  Technology Acquisition 
C1 We realise we are currently not world 
class (SM11) 
To take advantage of the 
technology and skilled labour 
(SM11) 
C2 It was an opportunity to strengthen our 
technological capacity (SM21) 
The UK has strengths in high end 
R&D; We want the technology to 
change (SM21) 
C3 The technology is dated and relatively 
low level (SM31) 
They [the Chinese acquirer] get 
Western technology, skills and 
personal networks; They are getting 
technical knowledge (SM31) 
C4 They lack engineering skills and did not 
have their own IP (SM42) ; They are 
looking to develop their technologies 
(SM43) ; Didn’t have the technology or 
the expertise to develop the products 
(SM43) 
They had easy access to a 
workforce of experienced engineers 
(SM44); they are learning the 
technologies (SM45); what they 
really needed was design and 
development capabilities (SM46); 
the UK engineering force is highly 
qualified and reputable (SM47); 
they ended up with IP (SM47 ; they 
wanted to use us for high end stuff 
(SM47) 
C6 Chinese engineers lack know-how and 
experience (SM61); they can’t develop 
products themselves (SM62) 
 
C7 They need that leading edge innovative 
skill; need leading edge technology 
(SE71) 
They are getting some advanced 
innovative design; They need that 
leading edge innovative skill; The 
UK has a cluster of companies in 
the design and engineering sectors; 
It is about creating innovative 
capacity (SE71) 
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C8 The UK has a lot of technology, skills and 
experience  which Chinese companies 
haven’t got (SE81) 
They come to the UK to access 
technology; By coming to the UK 
they will increase their in-house 
R&D capability (SE81) 
Source: Interview data 
 
Table 5: The use of acquired firm’s existing technology 
Company Quotation 
C2 The chips are designed and made in the UK. They are then shipped to China for 
testing and assembly (SM21) 
C3 The parent company requires finished designs and if we do not have the designs 
we are expected to get hold of them (SM31) 
C4 The first product was a simple makeover of an existing product (SM41); they 
bought rights to some products (SM43); their first brand was actually a 
modification of an existing model (SM43) 
Source: Interview data 
 
Table 6: New technology development in the UK 
Company Quotation 
C2 Many new R&D projects have been set up; We are developing the next 
generation of semiconductor technologies for electric vehicles, new energy 
vehicles, wind and solar energy, high speed trains…; We work with Universities 
of Warwick, Manchester, Newcastle (SM21) 
C3 We are developing a new machine for the Chinese market with our Chinese 
sister company and a UK consultancy (SM31) 
C4 Most of the products are new, based on new engineering (SM41); We have 
some traditional research projects with universities (SM41); Chinese engineers 
are working with a local consultancy (SM42); We are developing new 
technologies (SM45); A lot of our workload is for brand new clean sheet of 
paper designs (SM46) 
Source: Interview data 
